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that appcllee colleg es should be required to refund the payments received after 
this suit was instiiuted. 
2 . FACTS: Md. Code Art. 77A, §§ 65-69 (hereinafter the Act) provides 
. ---
for annual grants to private institutions of higher education within that state 
which do not award only seminarian or theological degrees . Various formulae ---------------
for computing the amount each institution is to receive have been employed; 
/ p resently that amount is determined by multiplying the number of full-time 
equivalent students who are not enrolled in seminarian or theological academic 
programs by 15% of the per-pupil appropriation for Md.' s public colleges. The ______________ _::___:_~:__~_:___: ________ ~-------=-
only restriction placed upon the grants themselves is that they may not be used -
for sectarian purposes . This limitation is enforced through regulations 
p romulgated by appellee Bd. of Public Works, whose members are the State's 
Governor, Comptroller, and Treasurer, which require that the institution verify 
b efore the funds are received and after they are spent that they have not been 
used for sectarian purposes. The State has the power to audit the institution if -
that is deemed necessary. 
In 1972 appellant taxpayers brought this action seeking to enjoin further 
payments to five private colleges and to require those institutions to refund the 
amounts already received. A trial was held before a single district judge who 
made the following pertinent findings of fact : (a) The purpose of the Act is 
secular because it encourages higher education and saves the State money. 
(b) The appellee colleges are not "pervasively sectarian." Each college is devo te( 
to the principle of academic freedom and the faculty is subjected to no religious -----
pressure. Although instructors at some of the colleges begin classes with a 
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Hiring practices at the colleges vary, but the faculties of none of the schools 
are dominated by a religious group and the primary hiring criterion at each is ----
academic quality. The single exception to these findings were the theology 
. _ ___, 
departments at the colleges which were staffed solely by clerics of the affiliated 
churches. Even then, however, the judge found himself unable to characterize 
the curriculum of those departments as devoted to indoctrination rather than 
academic study. (c) At none of the colleges is religious indoctrination a 
primary objective. Although four of the colleges had quotas for membership 
~z 
on the executive board based upon religion, only one received financial aid from 
" 
a church and there was no religious domination shown. The encouragement of ------
spiritual interest is a secondary objective of the colleges but their activities in 
this regard do not go beyond providing the opportunity for religious experience; 
there is no element of compulsion involved. Again, the single trouble spot was 
the theology departments where studies were limited almost exclusively to 
Christianity. (d) The regulations described above require sufficient detail to 
determine whether funds are being used for sectarian purposes and the 
verification and audit procedures do not enmesh the State in the colleges 1 affairs. 
However, in order to avoid substantial entanglements the Act must be adminis -
tered to prevent the use of funds to support the theology departments. 
Analyzing these findings under the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
{!!) ~ ) 
403 U.S. 602 (1971) -- whether or not the Act has a secular purpos ~ether 
w 
its primary effect is to advance or discourage religion, and whether it require s 
excessive entanglements with the affairs 6f the school - - a majority of the -----------
THREE-JUDGE COURT held that the Act was constitutional. It concluded that 
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sectarian purposes and that the nayare of the colleges and the type of aid involved 
was substantively indistinguishjl"ble from those in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
672 (1971), ar(d Hunt v. McNair :,,)413 U.S. 734 (1973), where this Court upheld 
grants to church- .,. ·:i;ed colleges. Finally, the majority held that appellants' 
request for a refund of previously made payments was barred by Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973). 
Judge Bryan agreed with the majority with regard to the propriety of a ---------refund and with its holding on the merits with respect to appellee Western Md. 
College and St. Jos eph 1 s College (which is apparently defunct). How ever, he 
argued that the potential for misuse of the funds and excessive state entangle-
ments was great due to the obvious church-affiliation of the remaining three 
colleges and open-ended nature of the grants. He therefore concluded that --------continued grants to those colleges violated the Establishment Clause. 
Appellants seek plenary review by this Court. They argue that the facts 
that the grants are open-ended and made yearly distinguish Tilton and Hunt, which 
involved one-time construction grants; the Act therefore fails the entanglements 
test. Similarly, appellants contend that the trial record supports the conclusion -
that all of appellee colleges except Western Md. are sectarian so that the grants 
to them have the primary effect of aiding religion. Finally, they argue that 
refunds should be made of all funds paid after this suit was commenced because 
appellees were on notice that those payments were :improper. 
All of appellees have fil ed motions to affirm in which they adopt the 
reasoning of the DC majority and contend that the questions are not important 
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facts . In addition, Western Md. points out that no one apparently disput e s tha t 
the judgment of the DC is proper as to it. 
3. ISSUE: (a) Do grants to appellee colleges under the Act violate the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments? (b) If so, should refunds be ordered? 
4. DISCUSSION: The DC majority was correct in concluding that the typ e 
..,___ 
of aid invo~_ed is the single fact distinguishing this case from Tilton and Hunt. 
Moreover, the dissent' s argument that the potential for abuse makes the A ct 
unconstitutional is not supported by the cases. Both the plurality opinion in ---Tilton and the opinion in Hunt concentrated on the facts of the cases before them, 
{ 
and both refused to strike down the statutes involved absent a showing of 
unconstitutional use. See 403 U.S. at 682; 413 U.S. at 742 -44, 74 7-49.--f Here, ----
the funding of sectarian activities is not an inevitable consequence of the aid 
program, there has been no showing that the colleges have violated the 
prohibition upon such use, and the Bd. of Public Works has not insinuated itself 
into the management of the colleges. Thus, unless a new "potential' for abuse" 
test is to be adopted for cases involving aid to church-related colleges and 
universities, appellees are correct in arguing that the findings of fact are 
dispositive here. 
There are motions to affirm from all appellees . . 
Walters DC op in JS 
1/20/75 
DK 
-1' Tk R;tl., vo'ti_ ;,._ \ ~ ~ ~ ~ 14- 1 ~ ~ 
~~~ ~ ~~ 
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July 8, 1975 
- -
No. 74-730, Roemer, et al v. Maryland (and several church-
related colleges) 
The purpose of this brief memo, dictated during the 
summer, is to aid my memory as to the issues presented, and 
my quite tentative reaction after a preliminary reading of 
the opinions and briefs. 
* * * * * * * 
This is an Establishment Clause case, involving the 
validity of a Maryland statute authorizing public aid (finan-
cial grants) to private colleges. The plaintiffs are four 
Maryland taxpayers who were held to have standing under Flast 
v. Cohen. The defendants (appellees) include the appropriate 
Maryland authorities, and five church-related colleges. The 
brief for the State of Maryland states that "only three insti-
tutions • are now claimed by the appellants to be church-
- ... ---
related," one having gone out of existence and Western Maryland ____,,,,,. 
having withdrawn as a party. 
At t h e time suit was instituted only five of the 
eighteen Maryland colleges that benefited from the legislation 






No. 74-730 2. 
statute, and the Maryland Attorney General states that no 
claim is made that the statute is invalid as to the thirteen 
non-church-affiliated colleges. 
The taxpayer plaintiffs (appellants here), represented 
by the ACL, sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity, and 
demanded -- if the statute is held to be invalid -- that the 
defendant colleges repay the State of Maryland. A three-judge 
court was convened. One judge, District Judge Young, conducted -
fact-finding hearings as to the character of the schools and 
the administration of the Act. His findings of fact (see A-35 ,... - ...... ..wwwsa,,,,,,,..-
in the jurisdictional statement) are incorporated into the 
majority opinion of the three-judge court. 
Majority Opinion Below 
Applying the three-part test set forth in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, a majority of the three-judge court -- relying heavil 
on the findings of fact -- concluded (i) the statute has a 
secular legislative purpose; (ii) its primary effect neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; (iii) the statute does not 
foster excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 
As would be expected, the majority relied primarily on 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 617 and Hunt v. McMair, 413 U.S. 
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Although the church-related schools are affiliated 
with the Catholic Church, I believe each is operated by a 
Board of Trustees with substantial autonomy. Each calls 
itself a liberal arts college, with the overwhelming emphasis 
on non-religious subjects. It is true, however, that each 
of the colleges requires a course in religion ~ In some of 
the colleges, courses are opened with a prayer. But the 
district court found as a fact that academic freedom prevailed 
at these institutions. In short, the district court concluded 
with minor exceptions (which were deemed correctible by the 
State Board of Higher Education) -- that the three-part test 
was met. 
Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Bryan emphasized the potential for abuse and 
entanglement. He thought these, rather than actual experience 
of the defendant colleges, were controlling as to the validity 
of the statute. In view of the absence of safeguards against 
the possible abuse (e.g., use of funds for religious purposes), 
Judge Bryan thought the statute was invalid. 
Comments: 
Having written the Court's opinions in Nyquist and Hunt, 
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a case of this kind, is the correct application of these 
principles to the Maryland statute and to the particular 
colleges in this litigation. This involves a careful 
factual analysis. 
I have no doubt that a properly drawn statute, 
authorizing aid to non-Sectarian colleges, would be valid. 
I also believe that a statute which authorized specified 
forms of aid to all colleges would be valid. For example, 
the GI Bill of Rights provides scholarship funds for veterans 
without any limitation as to the colleges which receive such 
funds. But the Maryland statute provides state funds directly 
to the colleges themselves, including church-affiliated schools. 
The statute itself appears to contain, as the dissenting judge 
points out, relatively limited standards to assure non-Sectarian 
use. Reliance is placed on the Board of Higher Education to 
accomplish this necessary result. 
I will want a memorandum comparing the statute and the 
facts in this case with those in the more relevant decisions of 
this Court. 
utsr;;;:; ,~  :~~~~ ~~ ·~-
~ s-=-- ~C,.·~dl,t,~;~~~·~ 
~ MEMORANDUM~  /-k.tl., 
- ~~ ~ ~ Ir ftf C/Vd..L....,,.-~ ~~J 
TO~~ Jus~ _!,9"'.'.;1;\ ... µ ATE l'"A;;:;;t 7, 197 5 
FROM: Greg ~ lm ~ ~ ,_ , ~-L n ~ k_ 
1'?---.1~~.v, s~ <::k..~ , - ~ 
~¥- ~-...-3-~ ~.,....d....., '1 r_,..,~ 
No. 74-730 Roemer v. Board of P~ub lLi~c~ W~or~k~sr-...:...-.!.. __ .:__ 
JIV) ~ 3<)/Gr ~~ M&t. s- Cll.d -1-o ~.~ 
- A .u.,, ____ ·-·----· This is a close case. My recommendation is to affirm. 
-
-
The standard to be applied in Establishment Clause cases 
is well-defined. Taken together the decisions of this Court 
dictate that in order to be held valid the law in question, 
f i rst, must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose, e.g., 
Corrrrnittee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); 
second, must have a primary effect that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 
(1961); and third, must avoid excessive government entanglement 
with religion, ~.g., Walz v. Tax Corrrrn'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Lemon I); Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). Although the purpose/effect 
entanglement standard is easily stated, except for the purpose 
1 
component which here is clearly satisfied, by applying it 
1. The legislation essentially provides direct monetary 
support to all accredited private institutions of hi gher learning 
within the State of Maryland, except those granting solely 
seminarian or theological degrees. The evident purpose of 
this legislation is thus secular: to insure that acacfemic 
institutions of th"isgei'ieraltype which the State has reasonably 
concluded perform a useful function, continue in their operations. 
Appellees have not challenged the existence of a secular purpose 









to the facts of this case does not point to a resolution 
which is free from doubt. 
The meaning of the "primary effect" test has been dis-
cussed in several opinions of this Court. In Tilton, Chief 
Justice Burger, writing for the plurality, indicated that 
" [ t]he crucial question is not whe:t;:_her s.ome be.nef.it 1accrues. tbut wh~iiE:t ¼8~ ~E~Yct~!1.~~En}'Tl.fflary1 
to a religious institutiorl." 403 . s. at 6 fr. Al 41 -- L ~fi · 
statement might be interpreted to mean that once it has been 
demonstrated that the primary effect of legislation is secular, 
it is immune from further scrutiny, the holding of Tilton 
concerning the impermissible effect that possibly might result 
because the building-use restrictions there lapsed after a 
20-year period belies such a suggestion. 403 U.S. at 683. --
See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783 -784, n. 39. Subsequent decisions 
indicate that the effect inquiry should focus upon whether, 
despite substantial secular impact, the aid in question has 
a "direct and immediate effect of advancing religion." Meek 
'--- - ----...___...-,.-._. -war- ---- ---
v. Pittenger, 43 U.S.L.W. 4596, 4504 n. 1 (Brenna~, J., con-
curring in part) guoting Nyquist, supra, 413 U.S. at 783-784 
n. 39. 
The Maryland Statute proscribes the use of any of the 
monetary aid for "sectarian purposes." Since the Court has 
consistently rejected the recurrent argument that all aid is 
forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees 





critical variable here would seem to be whether the Court 
is will~ accept the t hree-judge court's conclusions con-
cerning the primarily non-sectarian nature of the appellee 
colleges and the separability of its secular and sectarian 
2 
functions. The findings of fact of the lower court are - -
3. 
extensive and no useful purpose would be served by restating ... 
them here. It appears, however, that the facts found by 
that court fully support its conclusion that the appellee 
colleges' primary purposes are secular. Moreover, religion 
is not so pervasive at these institutions as to subsume their 
secular academic roles; their sectarian aspects are distinct. 
I 
These colleges are virtually indistinguishable from those 
involved in Tilton. One discordant note is struck by the 
fact that at one of the colleges here, prayers are offered 
- -------
2~ This statement, of course, assumes that the State 
has established an administrative system that will assure 
that no significant aid is provided to support arguably 
secular activities at the recipient colleges. Although 
there has been little actual experience with the State's 
administration of the program since the non-sectarian use 
requirement was appended to the statute, there is nothing 
to suggest that the reporting and surveillance procedures 
that are provided for in the state, see pp. to 
infra, will not be adequate. In Establishment Clause cases 
the State is forced to walk a narrow path between the twin 
prohibitions against aid to sectarian activities and excessive 
administrative entanglement. See Lemon I, 403 U.S. at 668 
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As 
is developed below, if the aid program here is considered un-
constitutional it is because the State, in its conscientious 
attempt to avoid invalidation because of impermissible effect, 
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le I" 
at the connnencement of a majority of the classes. To be sure --participation in these prayers was found to be entirely voluntary 
and their origination was at the option of the individual 
instructor . But even so, when the practice is found in a 
majority of the classes it is disturbing. The lower court i n 
part neutralized this factor by characterizing the practice 
as another aspect of the individual instructor's academic 
freedom. This answer is not entirely satisfactory, especially 
when the practice is considered in light of the fact tha~ an 
underlying, although secondary purpose, of these institutions 
is to foster "religious experience". I do not think, however, 
that this one factor is enough to cast significant doubt on 
the lower court's conclusion that the primary goals of these 
colleges are academic and that they are not so permeated by 
religion that the secular aide cannot be separated from the 
sectarian. 
The religious permeation factor is thus the key to applica-
tion of the primary effect test in this case. Focusing on 
this factor is certainly not novel since it has played a 
pivotal role in several decisions of this Court. As stated 
in Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973): 
"[a] i d normally may be thought to have a primary 
effect of advancing religion when it flows to an 
institution in which religion is so pervasive that 
a substantial portion of its functions are sub-
sumed in the religious mission or when it funds 
a specifically religious activity in an otherwise 
substantially secular setting." 
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direct loan of educational material has the unconstitutional 
primary effect of advancing religion because of the predominantly 
religious character of the schools benefitting from the Act"). 
In considering this factor, it is important to emphasize the 
distinction first drawn in Lemon I and Tilton between religiously 
affiliat ed elementary ~r secondary schools and colleges, a 
distinction which has continued to be accepted by a majority 
of this Court. See, ~.g., Nyquist, supra, 413 U.S. at 777 
n. 33. For example, in Hunt the challenged aid flowed to a 
Baptist affiliated college. Differentiating cases such as 
Lemon I the Court concluded that the nature of the institution 
was such that it was not so permeated by religion as to make 
its secular and sectarian sides inseparable. The colleges here 
are similar to the college in Hunt in all significant respects. 
In fact, based on the degree of control by the governing body 
of their respective affiliated churches, the religious permeation ------here would seem to be less than in Hunt. In the context of -------- - -------the effect test, there is thus no substantial basis for a 
3 
conclusion different than that reached in Hunt or Tilton. 
Although the aid program passes the purpose and effects 
test with relative ease, the entanglement criterion presents ----------- - - ~ 
3. Note that although Justice White would almost 
certainly find no impermissible primary effect here, in 
Lemon I he rejected the distinction drawn by the Court there 
between secondary schools and colleges as a "makeweight." 
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substantially greater difficulties. In order to consider that 
ground it is first useful to outline the important features of 
the aid program. The Act provides for annual grants to any 
accredited institution of higher education within the state which 
liilt iiiiii ----- _ nSl-q Ga I 
- w-i - """" ...does not offer solely seminarian or theological degrees. The 
tr!£ I --:::::::--0 C::: • 4iii 
amount of aid is computed by a formula which considers the 
number of full time students at the co llege, as well as the 
average amount appropriated for students at four-year public 
colleges within the state. The only restriction placed on the - --grants themselves i s that they not be used for sectarian purposes. --......____ - ~ 
The aid program is jointly administered by the Board of Public 
Works, whose members are the State's Governor, Comptroller, 
and Treasurer, and the Maryland Council for Higher Education. 
The Board of Public Works is responsible for approving awards 
under the statute. The Maryland Council handles certain 
administrative duties connected with the program, including 
the critical one here of ensuring that funds are not used for 
improper purposes. 
In fulfilling its use duty the Council ep.gages in a two-
4 
level screenil}g process. The first level involves an evaluation ---
of the applicant institutions to determine whether they award 
principally theological or seminarian degrees, or if the ir 
4. Beyond its duties with respect to the aid program 
here the Council is charged with overall responsibility for 
coordinating higher education in Maryland to assure an 







educational programs are principally religious in nature. 
Several institutions have been disqualified from receiving 
7. 
aid after this level of screening. The second level involves 
a determination of the Maryland Council whether funds paid 
to the eligible colleges have been spent in violation of the 
statutory prohibition against "sectarian" use. At the time 
the college applies for its annual grant, its president is 
required to verify under oath that the funds will not be used 
for sectarian purposes. At the end of the fiscal year in which 
a grant is received, the college must submit a utilization-of-
funds report detailing how the funds were spent. That report 
is accompanied by an affidavit verifying that none of the 
expenditures were for sectarian purposes. If the information 
in these reports is insufficient or incomplete, the Council 
seeks additional information from the institution. The Council 
can also request that state auditors conduct an independent 
examination of an institution's expenditure of state funds 
if there is any doubt that the expenditure was solely for 
nonsectarian purposes. 
In evaluating the extent of the administration entangle-
------.._ ~ -- ____________.., ~ ~ 
ment here the three-judge court stated that it was applying -- --the three-factor test of Lemon I and ostensibly it considered 
(1) the character and purposes . of the institutions benefited, 
(2) the nature of the aid, and (3) the resulting relationship 
between the government and religious authority. But it is 






controlling factor here to be the nature of the institutions 
benefited. The court thus rejected appellants' attempts to 
distinguish cases such as Tilton or Hunt based on the nature 
of the aid provided. See Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement 
at 14-18. Similarly to support its conclusion the procedures 
required by the Maryland program are "effective and non-
judgmental," Id. at 18, the court relied heavily on the fact 
that because of the nature of the institutions there was no 
necessity for state officials to investigate the conduct of 
particular classes of educational programs to determine whether 
a school is attempting to indoctrinate its students under the 
g.uise of secular education. Id. Although I agree wi th the 
district court that the nature of the institutions receiving 
the aid is the key factor and that no impermissible degree 
------- - - ~ -------------of entanglement has been shown here, I think that the proper 
------ - .J 
resolution of that question is not free from doubt. Moreover, 
to support that conclusion there is a need to distinguish 
language in several prior decisions of this Court. 
In one sense it is obvious to state that the nature of 
the institution is the critial factor in the entanglement 
analysis since unless an institution has some sectarian 
connection there is no establishment question even to be 
considered. Sti11, the effect of this factor should be 
carefully evaluated at ea.ch stage of the analysis. The danger 
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limitation is a general prohibition against sectarian use. 
Moreover, the aid is in the form of an annual appropriation. 
Thus, in developing and appl ying the us e evaluation procedures 
outlined above, there is a not insignificant danger that the 
Council will become intimately involved in the operation of 
the recipient institutions. In Lemon I, the Court,in concluding 
that the Pennsylvania aid program constituted impermissible 
entanglement between church and state, noted that: 
The history of government grants of a continuing 
cash subsidy indicates that such programs have 
almost always been accompanied by varying measures 
of control and surveillance. The government cash 
grants before us now provide no basis for predicting 
that comprehensive measures of surveillance and 
controls will not follow. In particular the 
government's post-audit power to inspect and 
evaluate church-related school's financial records 
and to determine which expenditures are religious 
and which are secular creates an intimate and 
continuing relationship between church and 
state. 
403. U.S. at 621-622. Similarly, in reaching an opposite 
conclusion in Tilton, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the 
plurality, emphasized that the aid involved was a one-time 
construction grant and that no continuing relationship would 
be necessary. Also emphasized in Tilton and later decisions 
of this Court was the neutral quality of the aid program under 
consideration there; 
Our cases from Everson t o Allen have permitted 
church-related schools to receive government 
aid in the form of secular, nonideological 
services ... that are provided to all students 
regardless of the affiliation of the school which 
they attend. In Lemon and ViCenso . .. the state 





are not necessarily neutral greater governmental 
surveillance would be required to guarantee that 
state salary aid would not in fact subsidize 
religious instruction .... Here, on the other 
hand, the Government provides facilities that are 
themselves religiously neutral. The risks of 
Government aid to religion and the corresponding 
need for surveillance are therefore reduced. 
10. 
403 U.S. at 688-689. Since the aid here is continuing, and 
not limited to "non-ideological" fonns, and since a substantial 
review process has been created, including the auditing 
procedures alluded to in Lemon I, appellants argue that the 
relationship created here clearly constitutes unconstitutional 
entanglement. Based on the quoted language of Lemon I and 
Tilton their argument certainly is not frivolous. But I do 
not find it persuasive. The central distinction between 
Tilton and Lemon I is the nature of the institutions which 
were the recipients of the aid, not the character of that aid. 
As Justice Brennan pointed out in Tilton it was the teaching 
in the classroom which was the subject of the continuing 
restriction on religious use. 403 U.S. at 602 (concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, as Justice White 
there noted in his separate opinion the grant of a building 
creates a theoretical need for continued surveillance during 
the entire life of the building whereas an operating subsidy 
f or a given year invites surveillance for that 1-year period 
only. Justice Douglas similarly found that the 1-time grant 
distinction unpersuasive since continuing auditing would be 
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in part). 403 U.S. at 692-693 (concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). Finally, as the Court noted in Hunt: 
The Court's opinion in Lemon and the plurality 
opinion in Tilton are grounded on the proposition 
that the degree of entanglement arising from 
inspection of facilities as to use varies in large 
measure with the extent to which religion permeates 
the institution. 
413 U.S. at 746. The extensive findings of the three-judge court 
support the conclusion that the colleges here have as their 
primary goal the provision of a non-sectarian education in an 
atmosphere characterized by complete academic freedom. Despite 
their secondary goal of fostering the "spiritual development" 
of the students, the colleges do not seem so permeated by 
religion that their secondary sectarian ideals are inseparable 
from their primary sectarian purpose. Given this I think that 
the conclusion that there is not excessive entanglement here 
is defensible. This is particularly so given that Tilton 
(plurality and opinion of Justice White) and Hunt strongly 
suggest that facial challenges to statutory programs have a 
heavy burden to carry if they are to succeed on excessive 
entanglement grounds. On the other hand,it also appears that 
none of the prior Establishment cases which have upheld the 
particular form of aid provided have considered an administrative 
program as potentially extensive as the one contained in this 
case. Although there is no evidence whatsoever that either the 
Counsel or the Board of Public Works have insinuated themselves 
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that they may do so in the future. With the only restriction 
on use being that the aid not be used for sectarian purposes 
there is likely to be a not insubstantial amount of contact 
between the Counsel and the colleges concerning the types of 
activities encompassed by this term. On the other hand, given 
the nature of the institutions danger that the funds will be 
used for even colorably sectarian purposes would not appear 
substantial. It is also possible that although there may be 
frequent contact between the Counsel and the colleges during 
the program's first year concerning the permissibility of certain 
proposed uses this contact is likely to diminish significantly 
once the guidelines have been established. Moreover, the -
existence of the reporting system does not in itself appear 
to constitute excessive entanglement. In most instances •~- --there will be no need for the Counsel to look any further. 
Although the power to audit the financial records of church-
related schools was cited in Lemon I, apparently as an example 
of a dangerous continuing and intimate relationship between 
church and state, the statement there was made in the context 
of institutions in which the inculcation of religion was found 
to be a pervasive goal. Here, the nature of the institution 
would seem to make the dangers presented by such audits minimal. 
A final consideration is that the Court perhaps .should be 
hesitant to strike down any statutory aid program based on a 
~ 
t.--t-
facial attack on excessive entanglement grounds since the ~ 
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scheme entails too much contact between church and state. 
Of course, in many circumstances, this final ground should not 
be relied upon too heavily because of the possible interim 
erosion of the interests which the Establishment Clause was 
, erosion, 
intended to promote.Any subst antial/, however, would not , 
appear likely here. 
A final factor to be considered, one which has been 
termed the "significant fourth" branch of the Establishment 
Clause test that was implicitly added in Lemon I, Meek, supra, 
43 U.S.L.W. at 4604 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
5 
dissenting in part), is the danger which this aid program 
poses in terms of potential "devisive political effect." -
Opinions of this Court have often emphasized that unlike in 
the case of other forms of political debate which are considered 
5. This portion of the majority opinion in Lemon I was 
no doubt inspired by Justice Harlan's opinion concurring in 
the result in Walz. See 397 U.S. at 694 ("What is at stake as 
a matter of policy is preventing that kind and degree of 
government involvement in religious life that, as history 
teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a 
political system to the breaking point.") Board of Education 
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); 
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 203, 305, 307 (1963) (Goldberg, 
J., concurring); Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 
Harv. L. Rev. 1680 (1969). Whether characterized as an 
additional test, or merely as a part of the entanglement 
analysis, see Meek v. Pittenger, supra, 43 U.S.L.W. at 4603, 
quoting Committee for Public Education & Reli ious Libert 
v. Nyquist, supra, at entang ement int e roa er sense 
of continuing political strife"), it is evident that the 





- - 14. 
nonnal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system, 
"political division along religious lines was one of the 
principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended 
to protect .... " Id., quoting Lemon I, supra, 403 U.S. at 
- at 4603; 
622. See also Meek, supra/ Nyquist, supra, 413 U.S. at 797-798 
("while the prospect of [political] divisiveness may not alone 
warrant the invalidation of state laws that otherwise surviv e 
the careful scrutiny required by the decisions of this Court, 
it is certainly a 'warning signal' not to be ignored"). Since 
the aid here is in the form of yearly appropriations there 
is some danger that the program may result in political division 
along religious lines. The questions is thus whether this 
theoretical danger should be enough to strike down the statute 
insofar as aid is provided to religiously affiliated colleges 
similar to appellees. Recognizing that the fear of potential 
political strife is a ground which several members of the 
Court would have play a more determinative role in the decisions 
of this Court in the Establishment of Religion area,~ Meek, 
supra, 43 U.S.L.W. at 4604 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), it is my conclusion that the actual danger 
posed here is not great enough to justify invalidating ~ tatute. 
In rejecting the political entanglement attack the three-judge 
court relied heavily on the statement of the plurality in 
Tilton that: 
The potential for devisiveness inherent in the 
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schools is significantly less with respect to a 
college or a university whose student constituency 
is not local but diverse and widely dispersed. 
403 U.S. at 688-689. Although I do not find the distinction 
between secondary schools and colleges to be important for 
, "" ¼e Tc\-\-cM i>\vv,-c:...\,~ 1 
the reasons cited l -, the secondary school/college 
dichotomy is important because of the religious permeation 0 
factor. The three-judge court concluded that the colleges here 
are substantially autonomous and primarily secular institutions , 
-,, < ...._,, :as=-:::::-:-:: ,------~ --
with little direct control being exercised by their affiliated 
chur ches . There is thus far less danger that debate over the 
size of allocations or the scope of the allocations will involve 
the affiliated churches to any significant degree in the 
political controversy. Even more important is the fact the 
program is designed to aid higher education generally, not ------------ -church-affiliated colleges specifically. At the time of the 
three-judge court opinion, only five of the 18 eligible ) 
institutions which had received funds were church affiliated. 
- ------------------------ --- --
This situation is thus different from that found in a case 
such as Nyquist where 85% of the students in New York who 
benefitted from the program were attending church-affilidated 
secondary and elementary schools, primarily of the Roman 
Catholic faith. On the other hand, the recipient schools are 
likely to lobby for increases in aid. Despite the distinction 
drawn in Tilton based on the less local character of the 
student bodies at colleges in contrast to secondary schools, 
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at the colleges here would be from Maryland. The danger 
of political strife on a state-wide basis is thus apparent. 
Again, however, given the basic non-sectarian nature of these 
institutions I do not think that this theoretical danger 
should justify striking down the aid program now. It would 
seem prefereable to permit the program to continue to function. 
Should significant political strife subsequently develop, the 
validity of the statute can then be re-evaluated. 
If contrary to the recommendation of this memorandum the 
Court holds that the Maryland aid program is unconstitutional 
because of the potential for administrative entanglement or 
political strife - a not improbable event - the appellee 
colleges should not be required to refund any of the funds 
which they have thus far received. 
Appellants' refund claim is limited to a single payment 
made to one institution in 1974 relative to its graduate 
degree program and the later disbursement of previously 
escrowed funds made only after the three-judge court had 
held the aid program to be constitutional. Although unlike 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973), appellants 
unsuccessfully did attempt to obtain injunctive relief pending 
appeal that one factor should not be enough to require a 
refund. Significantly, the aid program here, unlike that in 
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6 
1974 payment, none of the disputed disbursements were made 
until after that determination the recipient schools appear 
to have the strong reliance interest which the Lemon II 
Court noted "[w]eigh[s] heavily in the shaping of an appropriate 
equitable remedy." 411 U.S. at 203. See City of Phoenix v. 
Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 
395 U.S. 701 (1969); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 
U.S . 544 (1969). To be sure the decision was not without 
dissent but that alone would not appear decisive. Moreover, 
there were., 
unlike in Lemon II,)no additional payments. And, as in 
Lemon II, the final audit procedures required to insure that 
none of the funds di spersed since the three-judge court 
decision have been improperly used for sectarian purposes 
do not represent any significant danger to the primary interests 
protected by the Establishment Clause. In sum, the Court 
should adhere to its admonition in Lemon II that the validity 
of prior state action should only be made to turn on subsequent 
federal court rulings under the most unusual of circumstances. 
See 411 U.S. at 207-08. 
Greg 
ss 
6 . The 1974 payment was made to Loyola College subsequent 
to entry of the findings of fact by the three-judge court. The 
payment was made solely on the basis of graduate degrees awarded 
and was to be used in connection with the college's graduat e 
degree program. As the state appellees point out, this case 
was tried solely with respect to the college level programs 
of the appellee institutions and no evidence was introduced 
with respect to graduate level programs. See Brief of 
State Appellees at 50. 
- • 
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Mar c h 8 , 1976 
Re: 74-730 - Roemer v. Board of Public Works 
of Maryland , 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFEREN CE: 
At Conference I passed on my vote. I have 






j;upunu ~imrt of flr.t ~~ ~hdtg 
Jht1tJri:nghttt. J. ~ 2.llffeJ!., 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 4, 1976 
Re: No. 74-730 - Roemer v. Bd of Public Works 
Dear Harry: 
I shall write separately in this case. 
Sincerely, 
A~ 
Mr. Justice Blackmun , 
Copies to Conference 
I 
I 
8tllJ .tno.&: JO a~ed lS.llJ 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL June 8, 1976 
Re: No. 74-730 -- John C. Roemer, III v. Board of 
Public Works of Maryland 
Dear Bill: 




Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
V 
- -
.:§uprtt1tt <!Jattri .o-f iltt ~th ;§taus 
jiru4tng~ ~. ~ 211.;r'l, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST I 
June 11, 1976 
Re: No.74-730 - Roemer v. Board of Public Works 
Dear Harry: 
I am undoubtedly with you in the result in this case; 
as you perceptively indicated in the leaving of blanks for 
joiners, I am awaiting Byron's writing because of our 
minority views in Meek and Nyquist. 
Sincerely, 
WJ/YV 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS O F 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -j)ttpTtmt (!Jonrl of tqt ~~ j)taftg 
Jfasltmghtl4 ,. QJ. 2.tl.;,'k~ 
June 16 , 1 9 7 6 
Re: 74-730 - Roemer v. Board of Public Works 
of Maryland 
Dear Harry: 
I join your June 3 proposed opinion. 
-;J 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
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jiru1frht.g~ ~- (!I. 2llffe~.;l 
CHAMBE RS OF 
JUSTI CE WILLIAM H . REHNQU IST 
June 16, 1976 
Re: No. 74-730 - Roemer v. Board of Public Works 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your separate concurrence in this 
case. 
Sincerely, ~, . / 
t (,' v I,, 
f_,, v 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
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